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HUMAN ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION:
LEGAL ASPECTS
THOMAS J. FORD *
I T IS A COMMONPLACE that ours is an age of complexity. A feature
of a complex age is the phasing out of simple solutions precisely
because it becomes obvious that the problems of a complex age have
no simple solutions. When medical science opens doors revealing
new vistas of life to human eyes, we must together deal with balanc-
ing the tensions that then arise between science, culture, law and
morality. On December 3, 1967 the attention of the world was
riveted on South Africa where Dr. Christian Barnard transplanted a
human heart to replace the worn-out organ in the body of Lewis
Warshansky. Further heart transplants followed rapidly so that today
the world has witnessed more than 100 and Dr. Philip Blaiberg has
celebrated the first anniversary of his transplant lease-on-life with
the heart of a mulatto, Clive Haupt, beating strongly within his
breast. But transplants have been with us for more than a generation.
Corneas were successfully transplanted in the 1940's. A human
kidney was first transplanted in 1954. Many other tissues are now
being successfully transplanted, including skin, cartilage, tendon,
nerve, artery, heart valve and bone. The pancreas, the thymus, the
liver and lung have been transplanted in man. Eye banks, bone
banks, artery banks, pituitary banks and blood banks have been
established.
Although forty of our states have laws regarding human tissue
and organ transplants, the present laws concerning same are a com-
posite of archaic common-law principles, autopsy, unclaimed body
and medical examiner's statutes, and patch-work donor legislation.
The chart annexed (Appendix A) illustrates the situation in the
various states.
* B.B.A., J.D., St. John's University. Vice-President, Catholic Lawyer's Guild,
Diocese of Rockville Centre.
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The failure of the law to keep step
with medical progress, the severe time de-
mands requiring the speedy removal of
tissue and organs, and the need for uni-
form legislation in this field, has become
obvious. Uniformity is needed not only be-
cause of the great diversity of statutory
provisions on the subject or the lack of
any statutory provisions on the subject,
but also because of the high mobility of
the American population. Although a
gift of tissue or organs may be executed
in state A, death may occur in state B
and the organs given may be needed in
state C. Jet travel makes international
donation perhaps feasible. There is a
further need for uniformity to protect the
doctor, donee and others involved against
a suit for damages and/or criminal pros-
ecution for an alleged unlawful and un-
authorized autopsy, transplant or dissec-
tion.
Transplants of human tissues and or-
gans involve the patients, their families
and their doctors. They include:
A. Donation by a person to be effec-
tive during his lifetime.
B. Donation by a person to be effec-
tive at his death.
C. Donation by next-of-kin of a
cadaver.
D. Use by medical examiners, doc-
tors and others of cadaver tissue
and organs.
The right of an adult person of sound
mind to voluntarily consent to a tissue or
organ transplant from his body during
his lifetime has not been questioned.
However, consent must be informed as
well as voluntary.
New York's highest court has imposed
a duty on doctors to inform the patient
of the novelty of the operation, the risks
involved, the broad details of its execu-
tion and the fact that it is a procedure
not yet generally accepted by the medical
community.' The same court held that
the hospital is not responsible when the
surgeon selected by the patient departs
from standard medical procedure.
When a minor donates his tissues or
organs the consent of his parent or guar-
dian is necessary. 2
A donor of an organ cannot recover
against a tortfeasor of the donee under
the "Rescue Doctrine". 3 This case in-
volved the donation of a kidney by a
mother to her son. The son had recov-
ered damages in a cause of action for
malpractice against his physicians for the
loss of his kidneys. When the mother
sued on the grounds that her obligation
to donate her kidney also arose from the
physician's negligence in the treatment of
her son, her claim was denied.
Early common-law decisions in Eng-
land held there were no property rights
in the body of a deceased person. The
English Courts further concluded that
since a body is not property, it is not a
part of the decedent's estate, and thus a
person could not direct the disposition of
his remains. American courts did not
accept this reasoning and, therefore, in
American law the theory of a "quasi-
property right" evolved giving a decedent
'Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227
N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967).
21Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir.
1941) (A skin transplant from a 15 year-old
minor to his cousin without either parents'
knowledge or consent).
2 Sirianni v. Anna, 55 Misc. 2d 553 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1967).
in his lifetime, or the next-of-kin after
his death, authority to direct the post-
mortem disposition of the body. It has
been stated in New York that the wishes
of a decedent with respect to the disposi-
tion of his remains are paramount.4
There are few cases dealing with donation
of human tissue or a human organ by
either the decedent or the next-of-kin.
The severe time demands requiring the
speedy removal of the tissue or organ in-
volved and the reluctance of those con-
cerned to resolve disagreements over do-
nations by litigation explain the almost
total lack of case law on this subject.
In New York the applicable statutory
authority lies in Section 4201 of the Pub-
lic Health Law which had its origins in
the Penal Law and by a series of amend-
ments, since 1960, has reached its pres-
ent status. It is entitled "Cadavers-
prearranged disposition" and now pro-
vides in substance that:
1. A person 18 years of age or over
has the right to direct the manner in
which his body may be disposed of after
his death and also the right to dispose of
any part of his body which becomes
separated therefrom during his lifetime.
Although the statute sets the age at 18
years, it would be wise to obtain the con-
sent of at least one of the parents of a
minor donor.
2. Such person shall receive no rem-
uneration or other thing of value.
3. Any donation shall be by written
authorization of the deceased made dur-
ing his lifetime and signed before at least
4See In re Herskovits, 183 Misc. 411 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1944). ,
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two witnesses who also must be 18 years
of age or over and who also must sign.
The donee need not be named.
4. The hospital or doctor who re-
moves the organ, may not charge the
estate of the donor for services rendered.
5. The hospital, the donee, the doc-
tor and nurse are protected against civil
or criminal liability provided the donor
has executed a valid, written consent.
6. The authorization may be revoked
by the donor by a similarly executed
written instrument.
7. The body as defined in the statute
refers to the human body or any part of
it including the blood.
Absent the written authorization of the
decedent, a lawful cadaver transplant may
be made under Section 4210 of the Pub-
lic Health Law with the written consent
of the surviving spouse or next-of-kin.
However, next-of-kin are nof defined in
the Statute and this omission proves trou-
blesome. Further the consent must spe-
cify the purpose and extent of the dis-
section authorized. A consent to an
autopsy does not include permission to
remove organs unless specifically granted.
Section 4210a makes an unauthorized
dissection a misdemeanor.
Section 4211 of the Public Health Law
permits the delivery of an unclaimed
body to a medical college, school or uni-
versity for the purposes of medical, ana-
tomical and surgical science and study.
However, there is a waiting period of 24
to 48 hours before this may be done.
In line with recent developments, the
New York State Legislature has created
a Temporary State Committee on Vital
Organ Transplants under the Chairman-
ship of Supreme Court Justice J. Irwin
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Shapiro. Hearings commenced in New
York on December 12, 1968, and a
final report was due the Legislature,
February 15, 1969. However, Judge
Shapiro has requested an extension of
the deadline because of the vast amount
of information to be collated.
The Division of Medical Sciences of
the National Research Council which is
supported by the Surgeon-Generals of the
Army and Navy and the National Insti-
tute of Health of the Public Health Serv-
ice have instituted studies with respect to
human tissue and organ transplantation.
As a result of these studies and the work
of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, a final
draft of a Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
was proposed on July 30, 1968. It re-
ceived the approval of the American Bar
Association on August 7, 1968. A copy
of the Act is annexed (Appendix B).
This law has since been passed by the
legislatures of Maryland, Kansas, Loui-
siana and California and gives every in-
dication of general public support. It is
presently under study by the Legislatures
of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New
York, among others. Hawaii and Vir-
ginia have sought to deal with the prob-
lem by authorizing the coroner or med-
ical examiner of any county to retain
tissues at the time of autopsy to be used
for necessary or advisable scientific inves-
tigation including research, teaching and
therapeutic purposes. The Virginia stat-
ute authorizes the medical examiner to
authorize a transplant of the organ of the
decedent under his jurisdiction when
there is insufficient time to contact the
next-of-kin of the decedent. This "fait
accompli" approach has been urged by a
doctor and lawyer team-Dukeminier and
Sanders, in an article entitled "Organ
Transplantation: A Proposal for Rou-
tine Salvaging of Cadaver Organs". 5 In-
stead of Donation Legislation they pro-
pose a system in which the attending
physician would be allowed to remove
cadaver organs "routinely" unless objec-
tions were entered before such removal.
The burden would shift to the person
who did not want the organ removed
and he would be required to make
known his objections immediately. I be-
lieve that this method, which ignores the
sentiments and rights of the next-of-kin,
could arouse such hostility and resent-
ment to organ transplantation as to set
its cause back 20 years. Legislation such
as the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
allows for the advances of medical sci-
ence yet respects the interests and rights
of doctors, patients and next-of-kin.
The Uniform Act provides:
1. Any person, 18 years of age or
more, and of sound mind may donate all
or any part of his body.
2. It defines the next-of-kin and al-
lows the individuals specified to make the
gift immediately before death as well as
after death.
3. It allows the donee to refuse the
gift and specifies who may become do-
nees.
4. It simplifies the making of the gift
and renders a donative statement in a
Will sufficient without the necessity of
Probate.
5279 NEW ENG. J. OF MEDICINE 413 (1968).
5. It provides for card-carrying do-
nors and allows for next-of-kin consent
by telegraph, recorded telephonic or
other recorded message.
6. It provides for amendment or rev-
ocation of the gift by the donor at any
time and by any means.
7. It provides that the time of death
shall be determined by the physician who
attends the donor at his death and that
this physician shall not participate in the
procedures for removing or transplanting
a part.
8. It protects a person who acts in
good faith under the authority of the act
against damages in a civil action or pros-
ection in a criminal proceeding.
In short, it is a creditable attempt to
constructively and timely deal with the
scientific and medical advances of our
age. It illustrates the usefulness of med-
ical-legal liaison in this area and the
timeliness of this Symposium which is
co-sponsored by the Catholic Physicians'
Guild and the Catholic Lawyers' Guild,
but it is only a beginning and it raises
many serious questions which have not
yet been resolved.
Foremost is the question of the time
of death.
The necessity of a rapid transplant and
the certainty that the donor's death will
be caused by such transplant makes an
early and certain determination of death
crucial. Further, the donee's chances of
survival are lessened considerably by any
delay occasioned by the inability to make
a prompt and accurate determination of
the moment of death. What doth it
profit a donee to receive a "half dead"
organ?
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At present there is no legal definition
of the time of death based on 20th cen-
tury facts. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
did not feel at the time of their study this
past summer that a proper medical con-
sensus existed to enable a formulation of
a legal definition of the time of death.
Medical science is presently making a
valiant attempt to resolve this problem.
Until now the cessation of heartbeat
and respiration has been the accepted
medical and legal criteria for the deter-
mination of death. It is now known that
different organs and tissues die at different
rates and that a functioning cerebrum is
essential to the life of the human being
as a person. Consciousness disappears
within ten seconds of cessation of circula-
tion and complete and permanent loss of
brain function within 15 minutes thereof.
The cerebral cortical cells begin to die
within 5 minutes. The time of death
formerly depended mainly on factors
within the patient. It may now depend
increasingly on factors outside the patient:
The availability of facilities, the decision
to resuscitate, the choice of alternative
death concepts ("brain damage," "heart
death") and the decision to discontinue
emergency survival treatment. The avail-
ability of machinery to support cardiac
and respiratory function and the con-
flicting responsibilities of surgeons, coro-
ners and medical examiners require a new
definition of death. The following criteria
have been suggested:
1. No reflexes, no spontaneous breath-
ing, no muscle activity.
2. A flat EEG.
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3. The same results when tested 24
or 28 hours later.
These factors of no reflexes, no spon-
taneous respiration or muscular activity
and a slack EEG repeated after 24 hours
appear to be gaining support as the basis
for a defiinition of the time of death.
Until we have agreement on this funda-
mental fact we shall continue to have
situations such as occurred in Houston
recently. There the heart of the victim
of an assault who had suffered irreversible
brain damage, was kept beating by arti-
ficial means until a transplant could be
performed. The coroner chose to certify
the death on the basis of the cessation
of heart function. The District At-
torney was faced with the problem of
whether a defendant can be tried for
homicide when under present medical
standards the victim actually died under
the transplant surgeon's knife.
The times and the needs and the urgen-
cies continue to raise similar problems.
The advances in medical science that
now give a doctor the power to modify
the time of death for his patient also
mandate that he act. When he acts in
the true and conscientious pursuit of his
science and his field, he should be pro-
tected by the law.
There are other problems:
Will transplant life saving procedures
be available only to the wealthy?
The New York Act provides no remu-
neration for a tissue or organ gift. The
Uniform Act makes no provision in this
respect.
Will there be an organ black market
if we legislate against remuneration?
How far can a doctor go when the out-
come of a transplant operation is prob-
lematical?
If the situation is one of desperation.
If the patient will die if nothing is done.
Then even though the procedure attempt-
ed is a departure from past medical
practice, if there is a chance of success
there will appear to be some support
for the attempt.
What criteria shall be used to deter-
mine who shall live and who shall die?
In England a notice posted in a hos-
pital directed which patients in the case
of cardiac respiratory arrest should be
resuscitated and which should not. Those
over 65 with certain diseases fell under
the interdict. It raised a storm of
protests.
And who shall be who when heads are
finally capable of transplantings?
The advances in genetics are raising
further awesome problems.
National interest in these fundamental
questions is reflected in Senate Joint Re-
solution 145 introduced by Senator Walter
F. Mondale. This Resolution calls for
the establishment of a 15 member Presi-
dential Commission on Health, Science
and Society. The Commission shall
undertake a comprehensive investigation
and study of the legal, social and ethical
implications of medical research and re-
port its findings to the President and the
Congress within one year after its first
meeting. The President shall appoint
Commission members from among repre-
sentatives of medicine, law, science, the-
ology, philosophy, ethics, health admin-
istration and government.
Pope Pius XII has told us that we are
obliged to use ordinary but not extra-
ordinary means to prolong life. That
rather simple sentence covers extraordi-
narily complex situations. In a real sense,
we are obliged to "play God" and take
a role in the determination of the time
of an individual death. It is obvious
that these are questions to be decided
not by the doctor alone but by the doctor
and the next-of-kin and society. Now,
there is no escaping the responsibility and
the moral choices. It is perhaps the
highest function of law to help resolve
our doubts and stabilize choice by pre-
scribing a public policy reflecting a con-
sensus of values which pays heed not
alone to the scientist but to the theologian,
to the sociologist, and to the man in the
street. Pure science is separate and dis-
tinct from the moral order. A synthesis
between its imperatives and moral values
must be resolved. I do not believe that
this choice can be left to the self-discipline
of the scientists alone. Regulation is
necessary to prescribe the conditions of
human experimentation which will ad-
vance the science and yet protect the
dignity and health of the individual human
being.
As recently as 1963, we had an exam-
ple of the extremes to which the interests
of science will lead responsible men.
At that time it was scientifically known
that a healthy patient would reject a
transplant of foreign cancer cells promptly
but that a cancer patient had a delayed
and weakened rejection of foreign cancer
cells. It became a matter of extreme
scientific interest to determine whether
weak patients, ill from diseases other than
cancer, would reject foreign cancer cells
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quickly or slowly. The U.S. Public
Health Service and the American Cancer
Society financed an experiment for the
solution of the problem under the super-
vision of two doctors from the Sloan
Kettering Institute. These doctors, with
the permission of a Director of Medicine
of the hospital, injected ill and weakened
elderly patients with foreign cancer cells
and observed them over several weeks.
They did not inform them that foreign
cancer cells were being placed in their
system. Although oral consent was claim-
ed, the doctors did not obtain written
consent nor that of the next-of-kin of
the patients. The experiment determined
that weak, elderly patients have the same
rejection power of foreign cancer cells
as well patients-but at what cost in
human values ? 6
Dean Harold F. McNiece of St. John's
Law School has aptly phrased our pro-
blem in a letter to Senator Mondale-the
sponsor of Senate Resolution 145.
I believe the situation in the health
sciences is analogous to that of the de-
velopment of atomic energy. The avail-
ability of atomic energy has created a
technological capacity for great world
benefit or cataclysmic disaster and the
world has yet to agree to ethical guide-
lines to insure the former and foreclose
the latter. We are on the verge of a
similar situation in the health sciences.
It seems to me, therefore, that the
most critical area of exploration is the
development of ways and means of keep-
ing the social and ethical sciences
(Continued on page 168)
6Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp.,
15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.
2d 397 (1965).
"use your freedom as an opportunity for
the flesh" (Gal. 5:13). One might call
it the "mortifying" act of Christian free-
dom; the word may not be popular to-
day, but the notion is still Pauline (cf.
Rom. 8:13). In any event, it is the act
whereby Christian freedom stands forth
in all its evangelical newness, unique
among all the modalities of freedom that
men have claimed or hoped for or
dreamed of. "It was that we might be
free" in this new way, says St. Paul, "that
Christ has freed us" (Gal. 5:1).
Conclusion
The aim of this brief essay has been
simply to suggest how the rather fleshless
skeleton of the classical conception of
the ecclesial relation may be clothed with
flesh and animated with blood. The
skeleton remains the classical conception
of the vertical relationship of authority
15 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1969
and freedom. But it needs to assume a
more Christian and therefore more
human form by standing forth in the
living flesh and blood that is the Christian
community. More abstractly, the vertical
relationship of command-obedience needs
to be completed by the horizontal rela-
tionship of dialogue between authority
and the free Christian community. The
two relationships do not cancel but
reciprocally support each other.
This more adequate understanding
of the ecclesial relationship does not in-
deed dissolve the inevitable tension
between freedom and authority. But by
situating this perennial polarity within the
living context of community, it can serve
to make the tension healthy and creative,
releasing the energies radiant from both
poles for their one common task, which
is to build the beloved community.
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(Continued)
abreast, as it were, of the biological and
chemical sciences. I imagine this will in-
volve a reallocation of research funds
and personnel and, more importantly, a
reorientation of thinking on the part of
legislative bodies, government agencies,
foundations and others concerned with
the appropriation and expenditure of
such funds. In brief, we must become
more concerned with the why of scien-
tific advance and less, relatively speak-
ing, with the how.
Or as Senator Mondale says "Are we wise
enough to be so smart?"
We must heed St. Paul's warning to the
Corinthians, "And if I have all knowledge
but not have love, I am nothing."
